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Abstract The decomposition of the redistributive effect of an income tax 
into vertical, horizontal and reranking contributions according to the model of 
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), henceforth AJL, is revisited. When close 
equals groups are used, rather than the exact equals groups upon which the model 
is predicated, problems arise. A new measurement system is proposed, in which 
three distinct forms of reranking are disentangled and the vertical and horizontal 
contributions are redefined. Other approaches to measuring equity in tax systems 
are set in context. Findings are applied to Croatian data, and recommendations 
for users of the AJL methodology are given.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The decomposition of the redistributive effect of an income tax system into vertical, 
horizontal and reranking components has been much studied of late. A sequence of 
related papers, those of  Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), Aronson and Lambert 
(1994), and Aronson, Lambert and Trippeer (1999) lay out the appropriate (Gini-based) 
measurement theory for a model in which the pre-tax income distribution can be 
partitioned into exact pre-tax equals groups, and the tax system does not rerank such 
groups, nor does it (obviously) rerank the members within any group, in the transition 
from pre-tax to post-tax income. The methodology has, though, usually been applied in 
the context of close equals groups. See, for example, Wagstaff et al. (1999) and, most 
recently, Hyun and Lim (2005).  
 
The disparity between the model of the Aronson et al. papers and the domain in which 
the result is commonly applied is accounted for by the lack (or sparseness) of exact 
equals in typical real-world data sets, notwithstanding that the typical tax system does 
cause both rank reversals and the unequal treatment of equals (the former in most 
samples and the latter at the population level if not in one’s sample). In van der Ven, 
Creedy and Lambert (2001) it is shown that an arbitrary specification of close equals 
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groups can lead to misleading results, and a procedure to define the close equals groups 
optimally in terms of class width is suggested. Problems with the decomposition remain, 
though, as these authors note, “when reranking occurs within groups of close equals or if 
entire groups are reranked” (ibid., p. 385). Unfortunately these forms of reranking are all 
too common in typical microdata.   
 
The prevalence and implications of both reranking within close equals groups and 
reranking of entire close equals groups had not occurred to one of us (Lambert, during 
the writing of the Aronson et al papers), but became obvious to the other (Urban) as soon 
as an empirical study of redistributive effect in Croatia was begun. In the present paper, 
we explain fully the modifications which must be made to the measurement system of the 
Aronson et al papers when close equals groups are invoked by the practitioner, and when 
he or she finds one or both of the unenvisaged forms of reranking to be present in the 
sample data. In the process of thus tidying things up for empirical analysts working in the 
area, we have also been able to finally reconcile a number of approaches to measuring 
equity in tax systems which co-exist in the literature but appear to offer slightly differing 
recipes to the practitioner (principally those of Atkinson 1980, Plotnick 1981 and 
Kakwani 1984, but with connections also to work of King 1983 and Jenkins 1994), using 
a consistent theoretical framework.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain the three forms of 
reranking which a tax system can induce between and within close equals groups, using 
an illustrative data set. In Section 3, we carefully delineate a number of transformations 
between income vectors, appropriately ordered, which can be used to capture the vertical, 
horizontal and reranking stances of a tax system, using the hypothetical data of Section 2 
to illustrate. This leads to a fully articulated measurement system, in which three distinct 
forms of reranking are disentangled. Moreover, the various approaches to measuring 
horizontal and vertical equity in tax systems in previous literature, which we have 
referred to above, are all accounted for, drawn together and reconciled in the new 
measurement system. In Section 4, we apply the findings to Croatian data, and make 
recommendations for future empirical studies. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2.  Reranking within, and of, entire close equals groups 
 
In Table 1, the columns X and N present simulated but realistic-looking data on pre-tax 
and post-tax incomes. The first thing a researcher will need to do when he or she has 
gathered the data is to sort both columns together, by increasing order of pre-tax income. 
Already here the first problem arises. It may happen that there is specific amount of 
income, for example a minimum wage, received by many taxpayers. In our sample this 
happens for income units {#6,#7,#8,#9} and {#21,#22,#23}. We will call these income 
units pre-tax exact equals.  
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How should we arrange the post-tax incomes N of pre-tax exact equals? A simple way is 
to sort the income units in increasing order of post-tax income within each group of pre-
tax exact equals. This has already been done in Table 1.1
  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In reality, income units having exactly the same pre-tax income as each other will form a 
tiny part of the sample, or may be absent. Pre-tax income is usually assessed in terms of 
1/100th of a currency unit and most taxpayers will have different pre-tax incomes. Thus, 
the second step will be to form artificial groups of income units which have similar 
incomes. We call such income units close pre-tax equals, and use bands to allocate 
income units to groups. In Table 1, we have used a bandwidth of $50. The lower (upper) 
limit is $50 ($99.99) for the first group, $100 ($149.99), and so on. We obtain in this way 
six close equals groups with the following memberships: G1 = {#1,#2,#3}, G2 = 
{#4,…,#9}, G3 = {#10,#11}, G4 = {#12,…,#17}, G5 = {#18,#19}, G6 = {#20,…,#26}. 
 
We are ready to proceed with an intuitive analysis of reranking. Column rX in Table 1 
shows the pre-tax income ranking of income units. Higher income means a higher rank. 
Column rN shows the ranking of these same income units after the tax has been 
subtracted. The two scales are different and this means that the tax induces reranking. 
Observe the most drastic examples: the rank of income unit #19 goes down 8 points to 
11th place after tax; at the other extreme, income unit #11 moves up by 6 points to 17th 
place after tax. 
 
The process of reranking that takes us from rX to rN can be broken down into three 
distinct phases: within-group reranking, entire-group reranking, and a third form of 
reranking which we associate with the model of Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), 
henceforth AJL. In the column of Table 1 labeled K1, the income units are ordered as in 
the beginning, before tax, and in the final column, labeled K2, they are lined up in 
ascending order of post-tax income.2 We can go from K1 to K2 in three steps, as follows. 
First, note that in K1, the income units already fall into close equals groups, shown 
graphically by the boxes drawn around the groupings in that column. Now consider the 
following three steps, starting from K1: 
  
 1.  Introduce reordering of income units within groups only, such that post-tax 
incomes increase monotonically in each group. In particular, income unit #4 moves up 4 
places in G2. There are also changes in G4, G5 and G6 but none are necessary in G1 and G3 
By this, we obtain the column K3. The transition K1→K3 measures within-groups 
reranking.  
 
                                                 
1  Spreadsheet calculators and statistical packages offer the possibility of ordering two columns together, 
first by one column (X), and then by the second column (N), in a single action. This must be done before 
going further. If the building of N were left to accident, quite arbitrary orderings of N could emerge. 
2  For example, income unit #5, placed third lowest in column K2, has post-tax income rank rN = 3; income 
units #19 and #11, which have rN =11 and rN =17  respectively, appear 11th and 17th in column K2 (etc).  
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 2.  Now reorder whole groups, keeping the order of income units within each 
group unchanged, in such a way that the mean post-tax income rises monotonically from 
one group to the next. In the case of our data, this necessitates G3 and G4 changing places, 
since the mean post-tax income for G3 is 162.39 and the mean post-tax income for G4 is 
only 160.45. No other changes are needed. Column K4 is the result; the transition K3→K4 
represents entire-groups reranking. 
 
 3.  Keeping everything else the same in K4, we now introduce the final change, to 
K2, which is of a new kind, in that some income units ‘jump’ or escape from their 
original group to take up new positions elsewhere. Now all income units are now lined up 
in ascending order of their post-tax income, regardless of the group memberships. This 
final transition, from K4 to K2, which involves shuffles of members across groups into 
their post-tax positions, is the only type of reranking that can take place within the 
confines of AJL’s tax model. We will therefore say that the transition K4→K2 describes 
AJL reranking.  
 
 In summary, we have identified three phases of reranking here. The original (pre-
tax) ranking rX is that of column K1. The post-tax ranking rN is that of column K2. Three 
types of reranking, respectively the within-groups, entire-groups and AJL forms of 
reranking, are captured by the three steps of the sequence which took us from K1 to K2: 
K1  K3  K4  K2. All of these stages are involved in the redistributive process, as we 
shall shortly explain in greater detail.  
 
 
3.  Measurement system 
 
In what follows we allude repeatedly to the illustrative data of Table 1 above, but our 
arguments will apply equally to any data set and should be sufficient to guide the analyst 
in possession of real-world microdata.   
 
First, we order the income units by pre-tax income level and, among exact pre-tax equals, 
by post-tax income level. Call this ordering criterion O1. We used this ordering in Table 1 
above to define the columns X, N and K1. Table 2 below also contains this income data, 
as the two columns X and N1. The column for X is non-decreasing; the Lorenz curve for 
pre-tax income, call it LX, is computed using this ordering.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
For each row of Table 2, the N1-value is the actual post-tax income of a person with pre-
tax income given by the X-value at the start of that row. The vector N1 is not necessarily 
increasing. Indeed, it will exhibit decreases precisely when the tax system causes 
reranking (i.e. if, as in this data set, there are people with higher pre-tax income and 
lower post-tax income than others). Let C1 be the post-tax concentration curve with 
respect to the ordering O1. C1 will not equal the post-tax Lorenz curve if N1 is not 
increasing. Kakwani (1984) recognized this. For him, the transformation LX  C1 
determined the vertical characteristic of the tax system (see also Kakwani, 1986, p. 83-84 
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on this). For other quite different conceptions of the vertical action of the tax system, see 
on.  
 
Let O2 be the ordering of income units by post-tax income level (shown in column K2 of 
Table 1). N2, the increasing vector of post-tax incomes so ordered, is shown as a column 
in Table 2, and LN is the Lorenz curve for post-tax incomes, computed from N2. 
However, to the extent that the tax system causes any reranking, there are N2-values 
which do not correspond to the X-values at the start of the relevant rows. The transition 
N1  N2 unscrambles all reranking caused by the tax system. Atkinson (1980), Plotnick 
(1981) and Kakwani (1984, 1986) measure this reranking, which we call APK-reranking 
in the sequel, by the transition C1  LN.  
 
The mapping X  N2, associating each N2-value with the X-value at the start of the same 
row in Table 2, assigns to people at various positions in the pre-tax income parade the 
post-tax income value appearing at that same position in the post-tax parade. This 
mapping features in the work of King (1983) and Jenkins (1988, 1994), who characterize 
horizontal inequity by the 'distance' (somehow defined) between N2 and N1. See also 
Jenkins and Lambert (1999) and Lambert (2001, p. 247) on this. 
   
Next, the analyst must select close pre-tax equals groups. In the case of the data in Table 
2, we have used income ranges $50-$99.99, $100-$149.99, $150-$199.99, $200-$249.99, 
$250-$299.99, $300-$349.99 to define the groups. Obviously the pre-tax means are 
increasing from each group to the next. Now order the income units by post-tax income 
within each group, and order the groups by the pre-tax group means; call this ordering 
criterion O3. Column K3 of Table 1 shows the income units ordered according to criterion 
O3. Table 2 shows the post-tax income vector as N3 for this situation; C3 is the 
concentration curve for post-tax income according to the ordering O3. N3 will differ from 
N1 (and C3 from C1) to the extent that, as in our data set, within any close equals group 
there are people with higher pre-tax income and lower post-tax income than others in that 
group. The transformation N1  N3 unscrambles such rerankings within groups. But N3 
is not itself an increasing vector if, again as here, there are people in lower pre-tax 
income ranges [close equals groups] who have higher post-tax incomes than others in 
higher pre-tax income ranges [close equals groups]. The transition C1  C3 measures 
(only) the within-group reranking caused by the tax system; it does not unscramble 
whole-group rerankings. 
 
Now consider the ordering, call it O4, in which the groups are lined up in order of their 
post-tax means, and within the groups, the income units are ordered by their post-tax 
incomes. Within each close equals group, the ordering of persons is the same as for O3, 
but the groups come in a different order to the extent that the tax system reranks entire 
groups [making people in a close equals group with a lower pre-tax mean on average 
better off than their counterparts in a close equals group with a higher pre-tax mean]. In 
this situation, overlap can be seen between the post-tax income ranges occupied by the 
respective pre-tax close equals groups. In Table 1, column K4 shows the income units 
ordered in this way. Let N4 be the post-tax income vector so ordered, and let C4 be the 
concentration curve for post-tax income with respect to O4. As shown in Lambert and 
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Aronson (1993), the degree of such overlap is measurable on the Lorenz diagram by the 
transition C4  LN, and in the decomposition of the post-tax Gini coefficient across pre-
tax equals groups, by the residual term.  
 
In Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), henceforth AJL, the degree of tax-induced 
overlap of the post-tax income ranges of distinct pre-tax equals groups was measured by 
this residual, and characterized as a form of reranking, and shown to be a negative 
component in the redistributive effect of the tax system (itself measured by the 
transformation LX  LN). We call the transition C4  LN the AJL-reranking of the tax 
system in all that follows.  
 
Before moving on to the vertical and horizontal effects of the tax system, consider the 
transformation N3  N4. Post-tax income values are ordered from smallest to largest 
within each close equals group in both vectors, but the groups themselves are re-ordered 
in this transformation (by post-tax mean instead of pre-tax mean). We could capture by 
the transformation C3  C4 the effect of the tax system in reranking entire groups 
(having purged already within-group rerankings), but overlap clearly remains. AJL did 
not note the possibility that a tax system might engender entire-group reranking, because 
their model admitted only exact equals groups and they assumed that the tax on average 
had a marginal rate of less than unity (however, see their footnote 1, page 264).  
 
AJL decompose the redistributive effect of the tax system into vertical, horizontal and 
AJL-reranking components, in a model in which the population is partitioned into exact 
equals groups and the post-tax income on average in an equals group increases with pre-
tax income level (i.e. from one equals group to the next adjacent one). The vertical effect 
in this model measures, as a transformation in the Lorenz diagram, the effect of the tax on 
average across such groups. The horizontal effect captures the unequal tax treatment of 
exact equals, also as a transformation in the Lorenz diagram. To obtain these two 
transformations, an artificial post-tax income distribution is constructed in which pre-tax 
(exact) equals have a common post-tax income, equal to the average actual post-tax 
income for the group. 
 
In the current scenario, with the population partitioned into close rather than exact equals 
groups, we can replicate these constructions by also computing a counterfactual post-tax 
income distribution, one in which the operation of the tax system within each close 
equals group has been smoothed, and use this smoothed distribution to express the 
vertical and horizontal stances of the tax system. The way to do it is to make the 
counterfactual tax schedule distributionally neutral within groups - proportional, that is - 
rather than equalizing the incomes of close equals, which would involve rich-to-poor 
redistribution within each group, thus introducing a hypothetical and quite unjustified 
vertical effect within groups.  
 
This procedure accords with proposals of Camarero et al. (1993), Pazos et al. (1995) and 
Lambert and Ramos (1997), and strictly, it captures an estimate only for true classical 
horizontal inequity which is, of course, predicated on the tax treatment of exact equals. 
The horizontal measure derived from the analyst’s choice of close equals group and the 
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resultant smoothing may be negative in some circumstances, and the vertical effect 
correspondingly understated (see on).  
 
Thus for each close equals group, let g be the share of total pretax income taken in tax, as 
shown in Table 2. Ordering the income units according to O1 and forming the close 
equals groups as before, let N5 be the post-tax income vector that would obtain if, 
counterfactually, each income unit had its pretax income X reduced by the fraction g 
particular to its group, and denote by C5 the concentration curve for N5. If whole groups 
are reranked by the actual tax system, they will be reranked also by the smoothed tax 
system (due to the way the tax rate g is constructed, group by group). Thus the 
transformation LX  C5 has a feature which AJL did not recognize – whole-group 
reranking (but again see their footnote 1, page 264) – and it measures the full vertical 
effect of the tax system given the close equals groups selected by the analyst.  
 
For N6, which is a rearrangement of N5, we re-order the groups by post-tax means; within 
the groups, the income units take the values and order from N5. By this transition (N5  
N6), any whole-group rerankings caused by the counterfactual smoothed tax system are 
unscrambled (in the same way that they were for the actual tax system by the 
transformation N3  N4). As then, rerankings of individuals between groups are left in 
place (as evidenced, for example, in the middle part of the vector N6). C6 is the 
corresponding concentration curve. The vertical effect of the tax system as perceived by 
AJL, and appropriate to their measurement system as we shall see, is realized by the 
transformation LX  C6. 
 
Let NS be the vector obtained when either N5 or N6 is rearranged in increasing order, and 
let LNS be the Lorenz curve for post-tax income induced by the counterfactual tax system, 
derived from NS. The redistributive effect of the counterfactual system is given by the 
transformation LX  LNS. The APK-reranking caused by the counterfactual tax system is 
seen in the transformation N5  NS (and C5  LNS), whilst the AJL-reranking in the 
counterfactual tax system is measured by the transformation N6  NS (and C6  LNS). 
 
Finally, we come to the horizontal effect of the tax system. In Jenkins and Lambert 
(1999), two distinct, basic approaches to capturing the horizontal inequity (HI) in a tax 
system are identified and explored. Approach 1 focuses upon inequality of post-tax 
income among (exact) equals; approach 2 rests upon the person-by-person departures of 
actual post-tax incomes from those generated by a reference schedule, itself constructed 
counterfactually to be HI-free within equals groups. Approach 1 is typified by the 
methodology of AJL, whilst the work of King (1983) and Jenkins (1994) follows 
approach 2.3  
 
With close rather than exact equals groups, the AJL methodology would capture HI 
within each group by the inequality of actual post-tax incomes relative to that of the 
smoothed ones, and overall as an aggregate of these within-group effects. Lambert and 
Ramos (1997) characterize as pseudo-horizontal inequity the process whereby “it is as if 
                                                 
3  Two further approaches are in fact also enumerated by Jenkins and Lambert. These apply the same 
reasoning to tax liabilities instead of post-tax incomes 
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the tax acts to increase inequality within close equals groups” (page 29). N3 and N5, 
representing respectively the actual and counterfactual (smoothed) tax systems, are 
identical in their ordering of close equals groups, as are N4 and N6. Either of the 
transformations C6  C4 and C5  C3 can be used to capture the pseudo-horizontal 
effect of the tax system; this effect does not depend on the ordering of close equals 
groups. 
 
However the underlying transitions N6  N4 and N5  N3 break the link between 
peoples’ actual and smoothed post-tax incomes, because for N3 and N4, post-tax incomes 
have been reranked non-decreasingly within groups (compare N3 with N1 to see this), 
whilst for N5 and N6 the smoothed values, being derived directly from X, are (also) non-
decreasing but not reranked. Hence for a person-by-person comparison of actual and 
smoothed post-tax incomes, the transition N5  N1 is appropriate. This gives rise to a 
second possibility for specifying the horizontal effect, namely, via the transformation C5 
 C1. The two horizontal effects are related, as we shall see, and both can be negative, in 
which case the corresponding vertical effects will be understated.4  
  
We have now characterized a number of tax effects, by transformations between Lorenz 
and concentration curves, the latter constructed using various orderings of income units. 
Writing G for the Gini coefficient for a Lorenz curve L (hence GX, GN and GNS in the 
present case), and D for the equivalent index in the case of a concentration curve (hence 
the concentration coefficients D1, D3, D4, D5, D6), we may now arrive at numerical 
measures of the strength of the relevant effects of the tax system, as in Table 3 below 
(where they are written in their order in which they were presented, and with the 
underlying orderings of income units also defined for convenience). 
 
ORDERING CHARACTERIZATION                                                                                                  
O1  by pre-tax income, and among exact pre-tax equals, by post-tax income  
O2  by post-tax income 
O3  by post-tax income within groups, and the groups by pre-tax means 
O4  by post-tax income within groups, and the groups by post-tax means 
 
 
TRANSFORMATION CHARACTERIZATION     INDEX MEASURE 
LX  C1  Kakwani vertical effect    VK = GX – D1
C1  LN     APK-reranking     RAPK = GN – D1
C1  C3     within-group reranking    RWG  =  D3 – D1
C4  LN      AJL-reranking     RAJL  = GN – D4
C3  C4     entire group reranking    REG  =  D4 – D3
LX  LN      redistributive effect      RE = GX - GN
                                                 
4  A simple example shows this rather starkly. In a population of four persons, let the pre-tax incomes be 
114, 126, 194, 206 and let the corresponding post-tax values be 80, 80, 100, 100. Form two close equals 
groups, {114, 126} and {194,206}. The tax creates complete equality within each group. The 
counterfactual tax rates are g = ⅓ and g = ½ respectively, and hence the smoothed incomes become 76, 84, 
97, 103. Inequality is unambiguously higher under the counterfactual tax than under the actual tax, both 
within each close equals group and overall. This leads to negative measures for (pseudo-)horizontal 
inequity, and understated vertical effects.   
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LX  C5     full vertical effect    V = GX – D5
LX  C6     AJL vertical effect     VAJL = GX – D6
LX  LNS    redistributive effect of smoothed tax  RES = GX – GNS
C5  C6    entire group reranking of smoothed tax  RSEG = D6 – D5
C5  LNS   APK-reranking of smoothed tax   RSAPK = GNS – D5
C6  LNS    AJL-reranking of smoothed tax    RSAJL = GNS – D6
C6  C4 or C5  C3 AJL–type pseudo-horizontal effect   HAJL = D4 – D6 = D3 – D5
C5  C1   second type of horizontal effect    H = D1 – D5  
  
TABLE  3.  CONCEPTS AND MEASURES  
 
 
A number of relationships stem immediately from Table 3. First, we have: 
(1) RE = VK – RAPK
as in Kakwani (1984, 1986);  
(2) RE = VAJL – HAJL - RAJL 
as in AJL; and  
(3) RAPK = RAJL + RWG + REG    
showing that AJL did not account for all possible reranking in their study (namely, their 
model did not allow for within-group reranking or entire group reranking, which are both 
accommodated in the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani measurement system).  
 
Second, in respect of the counterfactual smoothed tax system, we have analogous results: 
(4)  RES = VAJL - RSAJL
which is the analogue of (1) and (2); and  
(5) RSAPK =  RSAJL + RSEG
which is the analogue of (3) (noting that the smoothed tax does not rerank income units 
within close equals groups). Furthermore, rearranging H = D4 – D6 = D3 – D5, we have 
that D4 – D3 = D6 – D5. This means that the entire group reranking of the actual tax 
system is the same as that of the smoothed version: 
(6) REG = RSEG 
 
Third, notice that what we have termed the ‘full vertical effect’ of the tax system, namely 
V, does not figure in any of the above relationships, and nor does the ‘second type of 
horizontal effect’, H. Using (6) along with the definition of V, we have  
(7) V = VAJL + REG
affirming that the AJL conception of the vertical effect of the (smoothed) tax system does 
not recognize any whole group reranking that may be taking place. Also, directly from 
the definitions in Table 3, we have 
(8) H = HAJL - RWG
exposing the within-group ranking difference that distinguishes HAJL from H. Finally, 
from (2), (3), (7) and (8) comes: 
(9) RE = V – H - RAPK
which is a decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking 
components that is identical in form to AJL’s (in equation (2)), but with different 
component measures. Naturally, (9) reduces to exactly the AJL form for a tax system 
such as AJL’s in the case of exact equals groups and no entire group reranking. 
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Summarizing, our careful modeling has exposed three alternative decompositions of 
redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking components. Two of these 
come from existing literature, namely: 
(1) RE = VK - RAPK            
which is due to Kakwani (1984) and lacks a pure horizontal term, and: 
(2)  RE = VAJL - HAJL - RAJL  
which extends the AJL methodology to the close equals group scenario but does not 
capture within-group and entire-group rerankings (if these occur). The third such 
decomposition: 
(9) RE = V – H - RAPK
which is new, rests upon the ‘full vertical effect’ and the ‘type 2 horizontal effect’, both 
of which we constructed ab initio for the close equals model. In this decomposition, as in 
Kakwani’s, the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani measure RAPK is the measure of reranking, 
and it captures all forms of reranking (recall (3)). Moreover, although the vertical and 
horizontal contributions V and H may be understated, as already explained, their 
difference, V-H, most certainly is not, since it equals RE - RAPK which does not depend 
on the close equals group construction. Of course, from (1), it must be that 
(10) VK = V – H 
showing that the missing horizontal term in Kakwani’s decomposition has to be netted 
out of his vertical contribution. In the case that H is negative (as in our example in 
footnote 4), V is correspondingly understated but Kakwani’s VK, which combines both 
terms, is independent of close equals groupings.  
 
In sum, we have here developed three vertical measures (VK, VAJL and V), two horizontal 
measures (HAJL and H) and four reranking measures (RAPK, RAJL, RWG and REG), all of 
which describe facets of an actual tax system – and yet another array of measures for the 
counterfactual (smoothed) tax system. What is the practitioner to make of all this? Which 
indices should be presented to the policy analyst?  
 
Equation (9) specifies the only decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical, 
horizontal and reranking components which takes account of all three forms of reranking 
identified in Section 2 of the paper. It also rests upon vertical and horizontal effects 
which we constructed ab initio for the close equals model, whereas AJL’s decomposition 
of redistributive effect, in (2), neglects important (and empirically prevalent) sources of 
reranking when applied in close equals group scenarios. Not only is RAJL inadequate as a 
measure of reranking in that setting (recall (3)), but also VAJL and HAJL are inadequate as 
measures of vertical and horizontal redistribution too - because, in contrast with the 
corresponding effects of decomposition (9), they take no account of entire-group and 
within-group rerankings (recall (7) and (8)).  
 
Table 4 shows the numerical values of all measures for the illustrative data of Tables 1 
and 2. For the recommended decomposition, in (9), vertical redistribution accounts for 
126.7% of actual redistributive effect, with losses of 4.9% and 21.8% attributable to 
horizontal inequity and reranking respectively. Kakwani’s decomposition, in (1), also 
shows a 21.8% loss of redistributive effect attributable to reranking, but this 
decomposition does not rely upon close equals group modeling and thereby lacks a 
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horizontal component. For AJL’s decomposition, in (2), vertical redistribution accounts 
for 125.6% of redistributive effect, with losses of 13.7% and 11.9% attributed to 
horizontal inequity and reranking respectively. The reranking effect is less for AJL 
because their model neglects within-group and entire-group rerankings. Indeed, from (3), 
AJL-reranking accounts for only 54.7% of the reranking induced by this (hypothetical) 




(1) RE     =       VK      –    RAPK 
      .045139   =   .054986   -  .009847 
(2) RE     =      VAJL     –      HAJL     –    RAJL  
      .045139   =   .056720 - .006191 - .005390 
(3)     RAPK     =       RAJL    +    RWG      +    REG      
      .009847   =   .005390  + .003974  + .000483 
(4)     RES     =       VAJL    –   RSAJL
      .054381 =   .056720   -  .002339 
(5)     RSAPK    =     RSAJL     +      RSEG
      .002822   =   .002339  +  .000483 
(6)      REG     =       RSEG  
      .000483  =   .000483 
(7) V       =     VAJL      +     REG
      .057203  =  .056720  +  .000483 
(8) H       =      HAJL    –     RWG
      .002217  =  .006191 -  .003974 
(9) RE     =        V        –    H        –   RAPK
      .045139   =   .057203  -  .002217   - .009847 
(10) VK      =       V        –      H 
      .054986       .057203  -  .002217 
 
 
 TABLE 4.     REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT AND ITS VERTICAL, HORIZONTAL AND  
           RERANKING CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE ILLUSTRATIVE DATA OF 
          TABLES 1 AND 2 
 
 
It is important to stress that all of these results (except that of Kakwani) are conditioned 
by the choice of close equals groups, which in this illustrative case were defined by a $50 
bandwidth. The choice of bandwidth also determines the counterfactual (smoothed) tax 
system (whose own characteristics for our illustration can also be found in Table 4). As 
we have pointed out, in some applications and for some choices of bandwidth, negative 
horizontal effects and understated vertical effects may be expected.  
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Finally, before turning to our Croatian data, we briefly consider the methodology used in 
previous empirical studies which have adapted the AJL approach to close equals groups. 
Typically, the vertical component of redistributive effect has been computed by some 
form of averaging within close equals groups, just as AJL do for the exact equals groups 
of their model.  
 
Thus, Wagstaff et al. (1999) and Hyun and Lim (2005) compute their vertical component 
of redistributive effect, let us call it VWAG, from the Kawani (1977) progressivity index 
TK  calculated for the averaged tax, call it kT , across members of each close equals 
group k, with no pre-tax income averaging.5 That is, VWAG measures the redistributive 
stance of a tax which is lump sum (i.e. highly regressive) within each close equals group. 
The reranking term, RWAG, is computed by these authors from the concentration curve for 
post-tax incomes when lined up by first by their pre-tax close equals groups and then, 
within those groups, by post-tax income. This concentration curve is our C3; RWAG in fact 
equals GN – D3 in our notation. The horizontal contribution, HWAG, is obtained as the 
residual (i.e. by subtraction), ensuring an exact decomposition:6
(11) RE  =  VWAG – HWAG – RWAG
From Table 3, we can in fact express RWAG in terms of familiar indices: 
(12) RWAG = RAPK – RWG = RAJL + REG  
Hence RWAG involves only two of the three forms of reranking known to be present in 
general when close equals groups are invoked. 
 
In van der Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001), henceforth VCL, the averaging of both pre-
tax incomes and post-tax incomes (equivalently, of taxes) within close equals groups is 
advocated in order to compute the vertical contribution to RE, call this VVCL. Hence VVCL  
expresses the redistributive effect of a hypothetical tax function that would transform 
average pre-tax income into average post-tax income in each close equals group (unlike 
VWAG ).7 Reranking is measured as RAJL by VCL, and, as in the other studies, the 
horizontal effect, call it HVCL, may then be obtained as the residual (i.e. by subtraction): 
HVCL = RE – VVCL – RAJL. The VCL procedure is consistent with economic theory, as can 
be demonstrated in terms of the decompositions   and 


















8 The notation here is, perhaps, self-explanatory: the components are the 
                                                 
5 This approach was also adopted by Doorslaer et al. (1999) in the context of health care finances.  
6 It must be said that, had HWAG been obtained directly, from the formula published in Aronson et al. (1994) 
rather than as a residual, namely as HWAG  = nkk nk Ga ,,∑ , where Gk,n is the Gini coefficient for post-tax 
income in close equals group k and ak,n is the product of that group’s population share and post-tax income 
share, then the decomposition would have failed. See ahead. 
7  The VCL approach has also been adopted in the recent paper of  Wagstaff (2004).  
8 For more on the Gini decomposition in general, see Lambert and Aronson (1993) and Lambert and 
Decoster (2004).  
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between-groups, within-groups and overlap terms (the first of these involving averaging, 
and the last being zero for the pre-tax income distribution, because of the way close 
equals groups are constructed). Subtracting one decomposition from the other, we arrive 










                                                
n which is VCL’s equation (4) 
(with a minor change of notation). In this, En = GN – D4 = RAJL and (GB,x – GB,n) = VVCL. 










(13) RE =  VVCL - HVCL  - RAJL. 
is exact when all terms are calculated directly.9  
 
As this discussion has shown, more than one attempt has been made in empirical 
literature to adapt the AJL system of measurement to the close equals group situation.  
The resulting vertical effects VWAG and VVCL have different rationales than both VAJL and 
V (involving forms of averaging rather than smoothing); the reranking effects, RAJL + REG  
(from (12)) and RAJL respectively, do not capture all three forms of reranking we have 
identified; and the (residual) horizontal terms, HWAG and HVCL , which differ in design 
very substantially from our H and HAJL, have somewhat fraught interpretations.10  
 
Table 5 shows all of these vertical and horizontal estimates, for our illustrative dataset. 
We find small differences between VWAG, VVCL, VAJL and V, and small differences 
between HVCL and HAJL, but the H of our equation (9) differs considerably from the other 
horizontal measures, and HWAG is untrustworthy, as we have explained.11 . Equation (9) is 
our recommended one, in which all forms of reranking are included in the reranking 
term, RAPK, and the vertical and horizontal terms have their own rationales, arising from 
 
9  Despite this distinction, it is nevertheless true of both the WAG and VCL procedures that, if the groups 
were of exact equals (so that Gk,x = 0 for all k), then the counterfactual tax function would become precisely 
the one of AJL’s model, and the respective decompositions would both reduce to AJL’s.  We can now 
understand why decomposition (11) would fail for close equals groups, were HWAG to be calculated directly. 
Subtract the decomposition of GN across close equals groups from GX : RE =  [GX – GB,n] –  
– R
nkk nk Ga ,,∑
AJL. The middle term on the right is HWAG as evaluated directly (see footnote 6), but the other two terms 
are certainly not VWAG and RWAG (the latter of which equals RAJL + REG from (12)). VWAG and [GX – GB,n] are, 
respectively, the redistributive effects of a tax which is lump sum within each close equals group, and one 
which completely equalizes the incomes of close equals.   
10 Just consider the VCL decomposition of RES for the counterfactual smoothed tax system. The 
“horizontal” term is HSVCL =  since the smoothed tax is distributionally neutral in 
each close equals group. But this counterfactual tax is HI-free by construction. Hence H
xkk xknk Gaa ,,, )(∑ −
S
VCL, which is 
clearly non-zero in general, can hardly be regarded as a horizontal contribution to RES. The “horizontal” 
measure HWAG fares little better. From (4), (6) and (7), RES = VAJL - RSAJL = [V – RSEG ] - RSAJL  =  V – RSWAG  
(with no horizontal term). Yet also RES = VSWAG - HSWAG – RSWAG  in which HSWAG is certainly not zero.  
11 Indeed, were HWAG to have been calculated directly for our illustrative dataset (see footnote 6), rather 
than obtained as the residual term needed to make (11) hold, then (11) would not have held: by direct 
calculation, HWAG  = 0.011006, much larger than any of the other horizontal terms (HVCL, HAJL and H), and 
violating (11).  
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the introduction of a counterfactual smooth tax function. Moreover, V and H can each be 
computed directly using the appropriate software (see on).  
 
 
(2) RE     =      VAJL     –      HAJL     –    RAJL  
      .045139   =   .056720 - .006191 - .005390 
(9) RE     =        V        –    H        –   RAPK
      .045139   =   .057203  -  .002217   - .009847 
(11) RE     =        VWAG   –    HWAG    –   RWAG
      .045139   =   .055034  -  .004022   - .005873 
(13) RE     =        VVCL     –    HVCL     –   RAJL
      .045139   =   .056806  -  .006277   - .005390 
 
 
 TABLE 5.  WAG AND VCL DECOMPOSITIONS, COMPARED WITH (2) 




4.  Empirical application 
 
As part of a research project on redistributional aspects of the Croatian personal income 
tax (henceforth PIT) and social security contribution (henceforth SSC), databases for 
personal income in 1997, 2001, and 2003 have been compiled.12 They are 5% 
representative samples from the respective populations of PIT payers, containing, for 
each taxpayer: gross income by source, social security contributions paid by the employer 
and employee (these are imputed), personal income tax paid, and the amounts of 
allowances and deductions. The following analysis draws upon these databases. Many 
other results of the research project are given in Čok and Urban (2005).  
 
The analysis of redistributive effect undertaken as part of that project showed that 
unequal treatments and rerankings caused by the PIT alone had a very limited effect, for 
example causing in 2003 a loss of under 3% of redistributive power. This was contrary to 
expectations, since the government had introduced 18 new PIT deductions between 2000 
and 2002 – and additionally, the personal allowance for dependants had been raised. 
However, the loss of RE is somewhat higher if both the PIT and SSC are taken into 
consideration, as the results presented below will show. This is undoubtedly due to the 
fact that the SSC is not levied upon pensioners, who make up a significant portion of the 
observed population.  
 
Pre-tax income X is defined as gross income before the PIT and SSC are imposed. 
Personal taxes T are given by the sum of the PIT and the SSC. We used income intervals 
ranging (on an annual basis) from 500 HRK to 5,000 HRK to define pre-tax close equals 
groups. The current exchange rate for the Croatian currency (the kuna) is EUR ≈ HRK 
                                                 
12  These microdata were compiled with permission, help and support from the Tax Administration.  
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7.30 and USD ≈ 5.71 HRK. The average net monthly salary in Croatia is 4,000 HRK. 
Values for pre- and post-tax inequality and redistributive effect are not conditioned by the 
choice of bandwidth for close equals. We show these values for 2003, along with the 
vertical and reranking components of the Kakwani decomposition (which are also 








VK (% of RE) 112.4 
RAPK (% of RE) 12.4 
 
TABLE 6. MEASURES FOR 2003 NOT CONDITIONED BY CHOICE OF BANDWIDTH  
 
 
Vertical redistribution, as measured by Kakwani’s (1984) VK, accounted for 112.4% of 
actual redistributive effect in 2003, with a 12.4% loss due to APK-reranking. When a 
bandwidth is selected in order to separate out the pure horizontal effect H from VK (recall 
equations (9)-(10)), results now depend on the chosen bandwidth. Table 7 shows the 
relevant values, for various choices of the bandwidth, and expressed as percentages of 
either RE or RAPK. 13 Figures 1 and 2 show the same information graphically.   
 
 
Bandwidth in HRK 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 
           
V (% of RE) 112.44 112.45 112.39 112.46 112.41 112.33 112.33 112.29 112.17 112.37 
H (% of RE) 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.15 -0.27 -0.06 
           
VAJL (% of RE) 112.11 112.27 112.32 112.36 112.40 112.32 112.33 112.28 112.16 112.37 
HAJL (% of RE) 0.42 0.81 1.19 1.53 1.89 2.20 2.49 2.78 3.04 3.35 
RAJL (% of RE) 11.69 11.46 11.13 10.83 10.51 10.12 9.84 9.50 9.12 9.01 
           
RAJL (% of RAPK) 94.03 92.15 89.52 87.11 84.54 81.41 79.11 76.43 73.39 72.49 
REG (% of RAPK) 2.66 1.48 0.60 0.78 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 
RWG (% of RAPK) 3.31 6.37 9.88 12.11 15.40 18.54 20.84 23.53 26.57 27.47 
HAJL (% of RAPK) 3.35 6.51 9.57 12.33 15.19 17.68 20.05 22.35 24.43 26.96 
 
TABLE 7. MEASURES CONDITIONED BY THE CHOICE OF BANDWIDTH 
 
                                                 
13  We chose to calculate the decomposition components in MATLAB, using procedures which were 
purpose-built. Details are available on request from one of us (Urban).  




























FIGURE 1 :  VERTICAL, HORIZONTAL AND RERANKING EFFECTS (AS %’s OF RE) 































































FIGURE 2 : COMPOSITION OF RAPK  IN  2003 FOR DIFFERENT BANDWIDTHS 
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Notice that H is almost negligible as a percentage of RE for small bandwidths. The 
question of an optimal bandwidth for estimating the components in our decomposition (9) 
arises. For very large bandwidths, as Figure 1 shows, H is seriously underestimated, 
becoming large and negative. In van der Ven et al. (2001), it is suggested that the 
“logical” choice of bandwidth would be the one that maximizes the vertical component of 
redistributive effect. However, this conclusion is linked to the VCL decomposition and 
not our (9), and would, if taken literally, involve maximizing VVCL and not V.  In Figure 3, 
we show all four vertical measures, V, VAJL, VWAG and VVCL, plotted against bandwidth for 
2003. Clearly, the numerical differences can be very significant. From our Table 7, a 
bandwidth of approximately 2000 HRK would maximize V as a percentage of RE. Then 
H ≈  0.03% of RE. Another finding is that AJL-reranking accounts only for a part of total 
reranking, and this part decreases from 94.03 to 72.49% as the bandwidth is raised. 
Evidently, as the bandwidth is widened, within-groups reranking rises;14 and as is to be 





















FIGURE 3 : V, VAJL , VWAGAND VVCL PLOTTED AGAINST BANDWIDTH FOR 2003  
 
 
In Figure 4 we show the changing compositions of RE and RAPK over the period 1997-
2003 covered by our data, for a bandwidth of 2000 HRK.15 It is clear that the contribution 
of reranking RAPK to redistributive effect decreases slightly in importance through time, 
and that, within RAPK , there is a downward trend in RAJL. 
 
                                                 
14  From equation (8), we know the relationship between HAJL and RWG. Since H is very small, we may 
conclude that AJL’s horizontal effect actually ‘hides’ the within-groups reranking within itself.  
15  The median values of pre-tax income were approximately  23,900 HRK, 26,900 HRK and 29,500 HRK 
in the years 1997, 2001, 2003.  
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  (B) COMPOSITION OF RAPK 
 
FIGURE  4 : COMPOSITION OF RE AND RAPK   IN 2003 
 
We cannot let it pass without comment that the empirical values of H for the Croatian tax 
system throughout the period 1997-2003 are exceedingly small, and approach zero as the 
bandwidth is reduced to zero (reflecting the lack of exact equals in our samples). On the 
other hand, even in the limit, we can still distinguish three kinds of reranking (refer back 
to Figure 2). The ‘no reranking’ approach to capturing tax inequity arose at least in part 
in response to the sparsity or lack of exact equals in sample data (if not in the population). 
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We conclude our examination of the redistributive properties of the Croatian PIT and 
SSC with a deeper consideration of the horizontal effect H. If a researcher gets such a 
small value for H, how can this be used in the meaningful description of tax system 
properties? One answer, perhaps, has been anticipated already in footnote 7: what would 
have been counted as HI before, when following the AJL approach, is now, in the fully 
developed measurement system, actually within-groups reranking. The tiny magnitudes 
of H may, of course, be particular to the Croatian data; for our illustrative data set, H 
amounted to 4.9% of RE. The main difference between the illustrative data and real 
empirical data lies in the number of groups. In Table 2, the whole population was divided 
into only 6 groups, with consequently large intervals; in the empirical case, we have 
small intervals and many groups.  
 
As an aside, we remark here that the horizontal effect according to our other measure, 
HAJL, and those that would be obtained by following the WAG and VCL adaptations of 
the AJL methodology, also become very small as the bandwidth shrinks, although they 























FIGURE 5 :  H, HAJL, HWAG AND HVCL IN TERMS OF THE BANDWIDTH IN 2003 
 
 
It seems intuitive that, the larger the bandwidth, the greater will be the absolute 
deviations of post-tax incomes from the smoothed values. Although this is not (quite) 
what H measures, a small modification can make it so. If the concentration curves C1 and 
C5 cross, perhaps many times,16 then there are areas for which C1 is above C5, and vice 
versa. These areas may 'cancel' each other, leading to a net value for H that may be very 
small and either positive or negative.17 Suppose we break H into two parts, HP being the 
                                                 
16  The number of crossings may theoretically be equal to K-1, where K is number of groups. 
17 This effect cannot be observed with exact equals. By the way the vector N5 is constructed, the 
counterfactual incomes in each group would be equal, as would the pre-tax incomes. Hence C1 would lie  
below (or on) C5 at all percentiles in this case.  
 - 19 -
sum of all areas where the horizontal effect is positive, and HN being the sum of all areas 
where the horizontal effect is negative, such that H = HP + HN. Now define HT as  
(12) HT  =   HP + abs{HN}  =  HP  -  HN
Referring back to the original rationale for H (in terms of person-by-person distances 
between post-tax incomes and reference values), we can see that HT measures ‘total HI’ 
across members of equals groups in terms of absolute deviations of post-tax incomes 














FIGURE 6 : “TOTAL HI”,  HT, VERSUS BANDWIDTH IN 2003 
 
 
As Figure 6 shows, the values of HT for Croatia in 2003 indeed increase as the bandwidth 
is raised, exactly as the intuition outlined above would predict; and these values are 
decidedly non-negligible for small bandwidths (e.g. HT ≈ 0.18% of RE for a bandwidth of 
2000 HRK, six times as big as H itself). Hence it could be misleading to interpret zero or 
near-zero values of H as “absence of horizontal inequity”.18  
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Following the impetus provided by the papers of  Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) 
and Aronson and Lambert (1994), a number of authors have undertaken decompositions 
of redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking components. The 1994 
papers laid out the appropriate (Gini-based) measurement theory for a model in which the 
pre-tax income distribution can be partitioned into exact pre-tax equals groups. The 
model assumes that the income tax system does not rerank equals groups; obviously it 
could not induce rerankings within equals groups (since all members of each group 
started equal). The methodology has, though, usually been applied in the context of close 
equals groups, not least because of the sparsity or absence of exact equals in typical 
sample data. When close equals groups are specified, typically it is found that reranking 
                                                 
18 When we repeated the calculations for Table 2, using not 6 but 3 groups, entire-group reranking 
disappeared and H turned negative, but HT increased. Its value rose to -11.7% of RE. 
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does occur within groups, and also entire groups may be reranked. The AJL methodology 
falls down in such a case, and needs to be rather carefully adapted.  
 
In this paper, we have explained the careful modifications which must be made to the 
AJL measurement system when close equals groups are invoked by the practitioner. In 
the process, we have been able to finally reconcile a number of approaches to measuring 
equity in tax systems which have co-existed in the literature up until now, but have not 
been fitted into a unified framework. We refer principally to the approaches of Atkinson 
(1980), Plotnick (1981) and Kakwani (1984, 1986), but have also pointed to connections 
with the approaches of King (1983) and Jenkins (1988, 1994). 
 
The adaptations of the AJL measurement system we were required to make for close 
equals group analysis were several. First, any tax system can induce three different forms 
of reranking between and within close equals groups, only one of which is possible for 
groups of exact equals. The adaptation had to identify and disentangle all three forms of 
reranking. Second, the vertical stance of the tax is characterized by AJL in terms of the 
averaged tax, where the averaging is done post-tax within each group of exact pre-tax 
equals. For the close equals group scenario, we needed to formulate a different 
counterfactual tax, one which “smoothed” the actual effect of the tax within each close 
equals group, and use this to express the vertical stance of the actual tax. Finally, in the 
AJL measurement system, horizontal inequity is captured as post-tax inequality 
introduced among pretax equals. Whilst it was possible to adapt this directly, and 
measure horizontal inequity in terms of pre- and post-tax inequality comparisons group 
by group, a far more suitable adaptation for us, the one which allowed us to complete our 
measurement system, rested upon person-by-person comparisons of actual and smoothed 
post-tax incomes within close equals groups. 
 
We explained the new measurement system fully by reference to the artificial dataset  
introduced in Section 2 to illustrate the three different forms of reranking that can be 
caused by a tax system when close equals groups are specified. Our recommendation for 
future users of the AJL approach is this. Having selected a bandwidth for close equals, 
decompose redistributive effect according to (9), RE = V – H - RAPK, and use (3), RAPK = 
RAJL + RWG + REG, to ascertain the percentage contributions of each form of reranking.19 
Now repeat the calculations for different bandwidths, and either focus upon the one that 
maximizes V, or, better, produce plots that show the dependences of the various 
contributions upon the bandwidth selected. We have one further suggestion. This stems 
from our detailed analysis of the vertical, horizontal and reranking characteristics of the 
Croatian direct tax system using the new methodology. In the face of vanishingly small 
values for H, the analyst may have recourse to the “total horizontal inequity” measure HT, 
which we have also defined, to check whether canceling (of deviations of actual post-tax 
incomes from counterfactual ones, in close equals groups) is rendering the H value 
extremely small. 
                                                 
19  Once the terms in (9) and (3) have all been evaluated, VK can be computed from (10), and  VAJL and 
HAJL from (7) and (8) respectively. Hence the terms in decompositions (9) and (3) contain all the 
information needed to arrive at the Kakwani (1984) and AJL decompositions given in (1) and (2), should 
these be desired. 
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unit X  rX N rN   K1 → K3 → K4 → K2
#1 57.13 1 47.27 1   #1  #1   #1   #1 
#2 61.87 2 51.42 2   #2  #2   #2   #2 
#3 68.61 3 61.75 4   #3  #3   #3   #5 
#4 100.36 4 93.50 7   #4  #5   #5   #3 
#5 121.59 5 55.68 3   #5  #6   #6   #6 
#6 125.50 6 77.44 5   #6  #7   #7   #7 
#7 125.50 7 88.50 6   #7  #4   #4   #4 
#8 125.50 8 100.40 8   #8  #8   #8   #8 
#9 125.50 9 112.95 9   #9  #9   #9   #9 
#10 160.61 10 151.59 12   #10  #10   #13   #13 
#11 189.49 11 173.18 17   #11  #11   #14   #19 
#12 213.41 12 170.73 16   #12  #13   #15   #10 
#13 213.43 13 128.49 10   #13  #14   #16   #14 
#14 217.81 14 152.47 13   #14  #15   #12   #15 
#15 219.42 15 153.59 14   #15  #16   #17   #16 
#16 232.44 16 162.71 15   #16  #12   #10   #12 
#17 247.40 17 194.81 22   #17  #17   #11   #11 
#18 264.12 18 184.88 19   #18  #19   #19   #21 
#19 278.30 19 149.40 11   #19  #18   #18   #18 
#20 309.37 20 185.62 20   #20  #21   #21   #20 
#21 321.17 21 180.58 18   #21  #20   #20   #22 
#22 321.17 22 192.70 21   #22  #22   #22   #17 
#23 321.17 23 200.34 25   #23  #24   #24   #24 
#24 326.91 24 196.15 23   #24  #25   #25   #25 
#25 333.37 25 200.02 24   #25  #23   #23   #23 
#26 338.36 26 203.02 26   #26  #26   #26   #26 
 
Between groups reranking affected these income units: 
#4, #5, #6, #7; #12, #13, #14, #15, #16; #18, #19; #20, #21, #23, #24, #25 
Entire groups reranking affected these income units: 
#10, #11, #12, #13, #14, #15, #16, #17 
AJL reranking affected these income units: 
#3, #5, #10, #11, #17, #19, #21 
 






   
   





LX N1 C1 N2 LN N3 C3 N4 C4 g N5 C5 N6 C6 NS LNS
             
0.0385 57.13 0.0105 47.27 0.0129 47.27 0.0129 47.27 0.0129 47.27 0.0129 0.1448 48.86 0.0133 48.86 0.0133 48.86 0.0133
0.0769                 61.87 0.0220 51.42 0.0269 51.42 0.0269 51.42 0.0269 51.42 0.0269 0.1448 52.91 0.0277 52.91 0.0277 52.91 0.0277
0.1154                 68.61 0.0346 61.75 0.0437 55.68 0.0421 61.75 0.0437 61.75 0.0437 0.1448 58.67 0.0437 58.67 0.0437 58.67 0.0437
0.1538               100.36 0.0531 93.50 0.0692 61.75 0.0589 55.68 0.0589 55.68 0.0589 0.2700 73.26 0.0637 73.26 0.0637 73.26 0.0637 
0.1923               121.59 0.0756 55.68 0.0844 77.44 0.0800 77.44 0.0800 77.44 0.0800 0.2700 88.76 0.0879 88.76 0.0879 88.76 0.0879 
0.2308 125.50 0.0987 77.44            0.1055 88.50 0.1041 88.50 0.1041 88.50 0.1041 0.2700 91.61 0.1129 91.61 0.1129 91.61 0.1129 
0.2692 125.50 0.1219 88.50            0.1296 93.50 0.1296 93.50 0.1296 93.50 0.1296 0.2700 91.61 0.1378 91.61 0.1378 91.61 0.1378 
0.3077 125.50 0.1450 100.40             0.1570 100.40 0.1570 100.40 0.1570 100.40 0.1570 0.2700 91.61 0.1628 91.61 0.1628 91.61 0.1628 
0.3462 125.50 0.1682 112.95             0.1878 112.95 0.1878 112.95 0.1878 112.95 0.1878 0.2700 91.61 0.1878 91.61 0.1878 91.61 0.1878 
0.3846               160.61 0.1978 151.59 0.2291 128.49 0.2228 151.59 0.2291 128.49 0.2228 0.0724 148.99 0.2284 152.89 0.2294 148.99 0.2284 
0.4231               189.49 0.2328 173.18 0.2763 149.40 0.2635 173.18 0.2763 152.47 0.2643 0.0724 175.78 0.2763 152.90 0.2711 152.89 0.2700 
0.4615               213.41 0.2722 170.73 0.3228 151.59 0.3048 128.49 0.3113 153.59 0.3062 0.2836 152.89 0.3179 156.04 0.3136 152.90 0.3117 
0.5000               213.43 0.3116 128.49 0.3578 152.47 0.3464 152.47 0.3528 162.71 0.3505 0.2836 152.90 0.3596 157.20 0.3565 156.04 0.3542 
0.5385               217.81 0.3517 152.47 0.3994 153.59 0.3882 153.59 0.3947 170.73 0.3971 0.2836 156.04 0.4021 166.52 0.4019 157.20 0.3971 
0.5769               219.42 0.3922 153.59 0.4412 162.71 0.4326 162.71 0.4390 194.81 0.4502 0.2836 157.20 0.4450 177.24 0.4502 162.77 0.4414 
0.6154               232.44 0.4351 162.71 0.4856 170.73 0.4791 170.73 0.4856 151.59 0.4915 0.2836 166.52 0.4904 148.99 0.4908 166.52 0.4868 
0.6538               247.40 0.4808 194.81 0.5387 173.18 0.5263 194.81 0.5387 173.18 0.5387 0.2836 177.24 0.5387 175.78 0.5387 171.51 0.5336 
0.6923               264.12 0.5295 184.88 0.5891 180.58 0.5755 149.40 0.5794 149.40 0.5794 0.3837 162.77 0.5830 162.77 0.5830 175.78 0.5815 
0.7308               278.30 0.5809 149.40 0.6298 184.88 0.6259 184.88 0.6298 184.88 0.6298 0.3837 171.51 0.6298 171.51 0.6298 177.24 0.6298 
0.7692               309.37 0.6379 185.62 0.6804 185.62 0.6765 180.58 0.6790 180.58 0.6790 0.4020 185.01 0.6802 185.01 0.6802 185.01 0.6802 
0.8077 321.17 0.6972 180.58             0.7296 192.70 0.7290 185.62 0.7296 185.62 0.7296 0.4020 192.07 0.7325 192.07 0.7325 192.07 0.7325 
0.8462 321.17 0.7565 192.70             0.7821 194.81 0.7821 192.70 0.7821 192.70 0.7821 0.4020 192.07 0.7849 192.07 0.7849 192.07 0.7849 
0.8846 321.17 0.8157 200.34             0.8367 196.15 0.8356 196.15 0.8356 196.15 0.8356 0.4020 192.07 0.8372 192.07 0.8372 192.07 0.8372 
0.9231               326.91 0.8761 196.15 0.8902 200.02 0.8901 200.02 0.8901 200.02 0.8901 0.4020 195.50 0.8905 195.50 0.8905 195.50 0.8905 
0.9615               333.37 0.9376 200.02 0.9447 200.34 0.9447 200.34 0.9447 200.34 0.9447 0.4020 199.36 0.9449 199.36 0.9449 199.36 0.9449 
1.0000               338.36 1.0000 203.02 1.0000 203.02 1.0000 203.02 1.0000 203.02 1.0000 0.4020 202.35 1.0000 202.35 1.0000 202.35 1.0000 
 
 
       TABLE 2.  ORDERINGS, CONCENTRATION CURVES AND LORENZ CURVES FOR THE ILLUSTRATIVE DATA OF TABLE 1
 
